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Abstract  
This paper reviews the alternative explanations offered to explain the Greek crisis and 
checks there analytical and empirical validity. The first part focuses on the mainstream 
explanations. It distinguishes three main versions (‘Greek disease’, EMU is an 
unrectifiable non-OCA, EMU has problems but can be rectified). Mainstream 
explanations are criticized for failing to comprehend properly the deep structural 
dimensions of the Greek crisis and attributing it to policy errors. The second part 
reviews the radical explanations and particularly those around the ‘financialization 
thesis’. It also distinguishes three versions (EMU is the problem, Minskian case, 
equilibrium of class struggle). These explanations are criticized for offering a weak 
structural explanation of the Greek crisis by focusing upon policy or conjectural 
elements. The last part surveys the more classical Marxist explanations of the Greek 
crisis. These have a different understanding of the relationship between real and 
financial accumulation from all the previous explanations. Three versions are presented 
(TRPF, TRPF and underconsumption, TRPF and imperialist exploitation). It is argued 
that Marxist explanations grasp better than the rest the deep structural dimensions of 
the Greek crisis. 
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I. Introduction 
Five years after its eruption, the Greek crisis continues to grasp international 
attention as one of the major epicenters of Eurozone’s crisis. It is considered one of the 
main sovereign debt crises threatening the very foundations of the ambitious european 
integration project (as expressed by the European Union (EU) and particularly its 
European Monetary Union (EMU)). 
Since the beginning of the Greek crisis, officially in 2009, several analytical 
streams compete in order to explain its causes and suggest relevant solutions. This paper 
reviews these various competing explanations of the Greek crisis. The analysis follows 
the Marxist Political Economy perspective but it argues that this perspective can explain 
better than its competitors the causes and the specificities of the Greek crisis. The main 
underlying analytical framework follows a circuit of capital perspective (Fine & Harris 
(1979), Foley (1986)). This means that the sphere of production is considered the 
dominant one in the total circuit of capital and the spheres of circulation and distribution 
follow. However, this interaction involves feed-back relations (that is the subordinate 
spheres influence in return the dominant one). The paper’s main argument regarding 
economic crises is that all major and protracted crises necessarily have a gearing in this 
dominant sphere of production. This does not deny the existence of crises that do not 
stem from the sphere of production. However, these crises are expected to have lesser 
and shorter impact in national and international economic affairs. 
The terminology employed in the analysis is the following (summarized in 
Fig.1). ‘Structural explanations’ trace the fundamental causes of crisis in the structure 
of an economy and not simply to erroneous economic policies (although the latter 
usually play their role as well). As such they focus on long-term processes. 
‘Conjectural explanations’ focus on erroneous economic policies (national and/or 
supra-national). Thus they emphasise short-term processes. 
‘Structural explanations’ are further divided in two sub-categories: (a) ‘deep 
structural’ and (b) ‘weak structural’ explanations. ‘Deep structural’ or ‘systemic 
explanations’ are those that trace the crisis causes in factors that lay at the heart the 
capitalist system. For the Marxist tradition these causes are related to its basic motive 
of operation (that is the profit motive and its main variable, the profit rate). Systemic 
causes stem from truly long-term processes. ‘Weak structural’ explanations add to 
conjectural economic policies some structural background. However, this is of a 
middle-range nature: it refers to the characteristics of a period or of a special state of 
affairs but not to the deep essential relations of the capitalist system. Such types of 
analysis are those, for example, that attribute the crisis solely to neoliberalism or to the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). 
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Figure 1. Analytical distinctions 
Explanations of crisis 
 
Structural    Conjectural 
 
 Weak   Strong 
 
The explanations of the Greek crisis are classified in three main groups: 
Mainstream, Radical and Marxist explanations. This classification is not formalistic but 
it reflects a direct correspondence between the theoretical perspective, the analytical 
focus and the policy proposals that unites the streams of each group and separate them 
from those of the other groups. That means that there is a significant uniformity within 
each group regarding its main analytical tenets and its policy proposals. 
Figure 2: Competing explanations of the Greek crisis 
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The Mainstream explanations are sub-divided in three streams: 
(a) The first one considers the Greek crisis as a ‘Greek disease’ (i.e. caused by special 
policy errors and resultant structural deficiencies). Therefore, it emphasizes mainly 
policy errors and recognizes structural deficiencies only as a consequence of these 
nationally-specific policy errors. This perspective is usually conferred by European 
pundits coming from the dominant EU circles. 
(b) The second perspective, usually stemming from Anglo-Saxon commentators, 
argues that whatever national ‘disease’ was aggravated by EMU’s structural 
deficiencies. That is, EMU is characterized as a non-Optimal Currency Area (OCA) 
which is prone to asymmetric shocks that exacerbate national ‘diseases’. Thus, this 
second perspective emphasizes the European structural dimension. It argues that 
EMU’s fundamental flaws cannot be rectified and its collapse is on the table. 
(c) The third version is a ‘middle-of-the-road’ blend: policy-driven (national disease) 
cum EMU’s rectifiable structural flaws. It is argued that while the Greek crisis 
has national origins it abated existing flaws of the EMU. However, these flaws can 
be rectified. 
All these versions are criticized for either attributing the problem to policy 
errors or having a weak structural explanation. The first perspective, faithful to the 
typical neoclassical approach to economic crises, considers the Greek case a national 
specificity created by bad policies. The second perspective recognizes a rather weak 
structural cause. It concerns mainly the sphere of circulation (i.e. how the common 
currency is related to diverse national economies) and has not much to do with the 
sphere of production per se. Concomitantly, Greek and the Eurozone crises have to do 
mainly with the architecture of the European monetary system. The third perspective 
also attributes the structural problems to the sphere of circulation (with the additional 
argument that, contrary to the second perspective, these problems can be surpassed) 
and neglects the sphere of production. Thus, all three Mainstream perspectives fail to 
appreciate the fundamental structural dimensions of the problem at hand. 
According to them the Greek crisis, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and moreover 
the 2007-8 global crisis have nothing to do with the sphere of production. The 2007-8 
global crisis is considered solely a financial one, having nothing to do with real 
accumulation. A more robust account should refer to the deeper structural problems 
that arise from the sphere of production. 
The survey of the Radical explanations focuses mainly on the more popular 
‘financialization’ thesis; i.e. the argument that modern capitalism is radically different 
from classical capitalism since money capital is not dependent on productive capital 
but it has acquired an independent mode of existence and dominates the latter. The other 
Radical stream, underconsumptionism (which is usually blended with the 
‘financialization’ thesis) is neither particularly popular nor applicable regarding the 
Greek crisis. The ‘financialization’ perspective emphasizes the structural component 
but only regarding the sphere of circulation which is, implicitly or explicitly, assumed 
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to dominate the sphere of production. Three versions of this thesis are discerned 
regarding the Greek crisis: 
(a) The first version places ‘financialization’ in the context of the North – South divide. 
It attributes the imbalances that caused the Greek crisis predominantly to this divide 
as it is articulated in the EMU. 
(b)  The second version downplays the significance of the North - South divide as an 
erroneous dependency argument. Instead, it attributes the Greek crisis to mainly 
national elements and less to EU’s or EMU’s structure. 
(c) The third version offers a Minskian inflation – disinflation explanation. 
The ‘financialisation’ explanations are criticized for offering inadequate weak 
structural explanations by not considering the problems in the sphere of production. 
Furthermore, it is shown that their empirical arguments are not verified for the Greek 
economy: the latter is far from being a ‘financialised’ economy. Thus these 
explanations resort to the stratagem of importing ‘financialisation’ from the external 
environment (the world economy). 
Marxist explanations of the Greek crisis differ substantially from the two other 
groups. They propose a strong structural explanation by attributing the fundamental 
causes of the Greek crisis to problems grounded in the sphere of production. In most 
Marxist analyses two structural components are being discerned. The first component 
is ‘internal’: it is argued that Greek capitalism participated in the 2007-8 global crisis 
which is a crisis a-la-Marx (i.e. stemming from the tendency of the profit rate to fall - 
TRPF) and not a primarily financial crisis. Thus the ‘internal’ cause of the Greek crisis 
is falling profitability. The second component is ‘external’: Greece belongs to the lower 
clusters of the European imperialist integration and, therefore, it is subject to imperialist 
exploitation (i.e. unequal exchange) from the more advanced economies of EU. This 
aggravated further the ‘internal’ problems of capitalist reproduction. All Marxist 
explanations focus on the role of profitability and on the complex interplay between the 
instances of production, circulation and distribution within the total circuit of capital. 
Three Marxist explanations are being discerned. The first version emphasizes 
the role of the TRPF in causing the Greek crisis. The second version recognizes that the 
Greek is essentially a profitability crisis. It adds that deteriorating competitiveness 
became a major aspect of the crisis and that, once the crisis erupted, the resultant 
underconsumption aggravated it further. The third version argues that TRPF was 
coupled with imperialist exploitation that aggravated further the falling profitability 
tendency and caused structural disruption in the Greek economy. The distinction 
between productive and unproductive labour is crucial for both the first and the third 
version whereas the second one leaves aside this aspect. 
The paper argues that Marxist explanations grasp better the deep structural 
dimensions of the Greek crisis and its roots in the sphere of real accumulation. 
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Table 1 summarises the crucial analytical differences that exist between these three 
currents of explanation of the Greek crisis. 
Table 1: Analytical differences among the competing explanations of the Greek 
crisis 
 Connecti
on to 
22007-8 
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crisis 
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Mainstream 
explanations 
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systemic: 
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culminatin
g in 
national 
‘illnesses’ 
Exchange 
and 
financial 
relations 
no yes yes 
Radical 
explanations 
internal 
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the 
financial 
circuit) 
Non-
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conjectural 
policies 
and 
structures 
Exchange 
and 
financial 
relations 
no yes mixed 
answers 
Marxist 
explanations 
internal 
(through 
both the 
financial 
and the 
productiv
e circuits) 
systemic Total 
circuit of 
capital 
(productiv
e and 
exchange 
relations) 
yes Looking 
behind it: 
capitalist 
uneven 
developmen
t 
No, the twin 
deficits are 
a 
consequenc
e of 
processes 
 
The structure of the paper is the usual. The next section surveys the Mainstream 
explanations. The third section analyses the Radical ‘financialisation’ explanations. 
The fourth section presents the Marxist explanations of the Greek crisis. Finally, the 
last section concludes. 
 
II. Mainstream explanations1 
As Mainstream explanations of the Greek crisis are categorised those inspired 
from the neoclassical and/or neo-Keynesian perspectives. Unsurprisingly, these 
                                                          
1 For a broader analysis of the Mainstream explanations see Mavroudeas & Paitaridis (2014a). 
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explanations are offered not only from established academic voices but also from 
institutional centers of the politico-economic elites both in Europe and elsewhere. The 
Mainstream explanations of the Greek crisis fall into three distinct perspectives. 
 
II.1 A primarily Greek ‘disease’ 
The first version has now become a bit arcane. It was expressed vociferously 
during the beginning of the Greek crisis and before the eruption of the Eurozone crisis. 
In its initial version it centered mainly upon the public sector as this basically came 
under attack with the first Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Greece and 
the troika of EU – ECB and IMF. Subsequently, after the first MOU’s reviews and as 
the private sector came also under attack, it was expanded to the whole Greek economy. 
In a nutshell, it identified the Greek ‘disease’ with two major deficiencies of the Greek 
economy: (a) large and persistent fiscal deficits financed through borrowing (which 
created large external debts) and (b) a falling competitivess. It argued that these 
deficiencies were caused by particular Greek national characteristics (special policy 
errors and structural deficiencies), i.e. it is a Greek ‘disease’. Therefore, it emphasizes 
mainly policy errors and recognizes structural deficiencies only as a consequence of 
these nationally-specific policy errors. Again unsurprisingly, this version was 
expressed predominantly by the EU, the ECB, commentators and think-tanks of the 
euro-core countries but also by the Greek governments that signed and support the 
troika MOUs. Of course it was echoed and popularized by Greek and international 
media in order to justify and legitimize the first MOU. 
This version maintains that Greece is a special type of economy which is prone 
to fiscal profligacy. It is argued that it is characterized by large and persistent fiscal 
deficits and a falling competitiveness. More specifically, the it maintains that the Greek 
economy is characterized by low productivity, high wages and a big public sector. High 
wages are the product of the big public sector which is clientelist (thus voters are bought 
through provision of employment and wages). In addition, the public sector has low 
productivity and a falling ability to collect taxes (due to clientelism fomenting tax 
evasion). Consequently, fiscal deficits are accumulated. These are financed through 
loans resulting in a widening external debt (expressed in a deteriorating current 
account). Cheap borrowing was possible because since the entrance to EMU Greece 
benefited from low interest rates. In addition, Greece exploited EU’s benevolence by 
forfeiting statistical data and thus violated the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (that 
founded the euro). With the advent of the 2007-8 crisis international financial markets 
started scrutinizing fiscal deficits and external debts. Consequently, the unsustainability 
of the Greek debt was discovered and the Greek crisis erupted. Thus, the deep fiscal 
cuts of the first MOU were justified. This was a political choice since the Greek and 
EU establishment aimed to pass piecemeal the MOU strategy. Therefore, it focused 
initially on the public sector and public employees by staging a truly defamation 
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campaign aiming at creating a rift between public and private sector employees. The 
slant of the ‘lazy and corrupt public employees’ is the trademark of this first version. 
However, as soon as the first MOU program started failing to reach its 
milestones, austerity had to be expanded to the private sector. That led to a new array 
of measures (such as the reduction of minimum wage, the deregulation of the labour 
market, the weakening of collective agreements etc.) that impacted directly upon the 
hitherto only indirectly affected private sector employees. In order to justify this 
expansion the problem of competitiveness was surfaced. It was argued that not only the 
public but also the private sector is characterized by low productivity, high wages and 
rigid labor market regulation culminating in a falling competitiveness. Consequently, 
the current account worsened not only because of public borrowing but also because of 
diminishing exports and increasing imports. High wages fueled consumption which 
was directed towards imports, since domestically produced goods were uncompetitive. 
The trademark of this new propagandistic campaign was that Greek workers 
collectively (private and public sector) are overpaid and inefficiently working. 
Papers from the governing EU and ECB bodies and also from the Bank of 
Greece are typical examples of this approach. For example, in the first Greek MOU 
(EC (2010), p.6) the origins of the Greek crisis are defined as: 
(a) Persistent fiscal and external imbalances that led to a significant increase in 
government and external debt 
(b) Rigid product and labor markets 
These Greek vulnerabilities were exposed by the 2008-9 global crisis. 
Subsequently - and while not at the origin of the problem - the banking sector was 
affected by the economic and confidence crisis (p.7). This verdict is reiterated in the 
second Greek MOU (EC (2012), p.9) where the origins of the Greek crisis are attributed 
to: 
(a) Unsustainable fiscal policies, partly hidden by unreliable statistics and 
temporarily high revenues; 
(b)  Rigid labor and product markets; 
(c)  Loss of competitiveness and rising external debt;  
It is again reiterated that ‘while not at the origin, the banking sector was affected 
by the economic and confidence crisis’. 
It should be noted that in its 2010 version this explanation emphasized fiscal 
and external imbalances with the emphasis on the former. The problem of 
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competitiveness is mentioned but in a somehow subdued manner. Moving to the second 
MOU competitiveness is brought forward and emphasized2. 
The Greek ‘disease’ explanation lost credibility when other EMU economies 
(Ireland in 2010, Portugal in 2011) were also obliged to enter in bail-out programs 
through MOUs with the troika: suddenly the supposedly Greek problem proved to be 
much wider. The initial defense was to attribute the expansion of the problem to 
contagion from Greece (e.g. Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2010). This was an obviously 
weak argument because it neglected the significantly different characteristics of the 
other economies (e.g. Ireland and its predominantly banking crisis). This newer version 
led to collectively branding these countries as prone to fiscal and banking profligacy: 
instead of a Greek a South ‘disease’ was discovered. Typical examples of this newer 
version of the South ‘disease’ are ECB (2012), Kosters (2009), Panetta (2011) and 
Weidmann (2012)). However, as the EU’s crisis expanded beyond the PIGS and started 
touching Italy and even euro-core countries (e.g. Belgium, Netherlands and France) the 
popularity of the South ‘disease’ explanation started receding. 
The analytical foundation of the Greek (or South) ‘disease’ explanation hinges 
upon the Twin Deficits Hypothesis which contends that there is a strong link between 
the current account balance and the government budget balance. A twin deficit occurs 
when an economy has a current account deficit plus a fiscal deficit with the causality 
running from the latter to the former. In the Greek case this argument is expressed as 
follows. An increasing fiscal deficit is caused by the profligate and clientelist state 
(mainly because of exorbitant wage increases but also because of widespread tax 
evasion). In order to finance this fiscal deficit the country borrows heavily. This has 
increased public debt. Since, after the accession to the EMU, external borrowing was 
cheap and indeed favored by the EMU’s rules then the public debt became external 
debt; thus deteriorating the already existing current account deficit. At this point a 
supplementary argument is brought forward: the current account worsened not only 
because of the fiscal deficit but also because of the falling competitiveness of the whole 
economy. Therefore, it is argues that the Twin Deficits Hypothesis is verified. 
The applicability of the Twin Deficits Hypothesis for Greece is far from 
unambiguous. Studies that tested it have produced mixed results. Most interestingly, 
recent studies (e.g. Katrakilidis & Trachanas (2011), Nikiforos, Carvalho & Schoder 
(2014)) has argued that while the Twin Deficits Hypothesis is confirmed for the pre-
accession to the EMU period (1960-80) it is rejected for the post-accession period 
(1981-2007). For the latter period the opposite is confirmed: trade (and thus current 
account) deficit has caused increasing budget deficit. 
                                                          
2The first MOU set as a short-term objective the fiscal consolidation and as a medium-term objective the 
improvement of competitiveness and altering the economy’s structure towards a more investment- and 
export-led growth model. However, in practical terms only the short-term objective was pursued. This 
was done by the PASOK government but in full knowledge of the troika (despite later bickering). 
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II.2 EMU is not an OCA 
The second perspective argues that, whatever national Greek ‘disease’ exists, it 
is aggravated by EMU’s structural deficiencies. Because EMU is not an Optimal 
Currency Area (OCA), it is prone to asymmetric shocks that exacerbate national 
‘diseases’. Thus, this second perspective emphasizes the European structural 
dimension. It argues that EMU’s fundamental flaws cannot be rectified (i.e. EU cannot 
become something similar to the US). This view refers to the Greek case (or the other 
PIGS), as a lever in order to spearhead its main criticism: EMU is inherently faulty. 
This perspective is expressed mainly by Anglo-Saxon commentators either neoliberal 
(e.g. Feldstein (2010a)) or new-Keynesian (e.g. Krugman (2012a)). There is an obvious 
explanation of this geopolitical origin. 
The euro is one of the main instruments through which European capitals 
attempt to dispute US world supremacy. More specifically, euro challenges the dollar 
as the main world currency (Bergsten (1997a, 1997b, 2002), Mundell (1997)). This 
challenge threatens not only US’ direct advantages from being the issuer of the main 
world currency (seigniorage etc.) but also its indirect strategic advantages that stem 
from this. Consequently, US hostility was expressed, even in academic debates, from 
its very beginning. For example, Feldstein (1997) criticised bluntly the upcoming 
EMU: ‘the adverse economic effects of a single currency on unemployment and 
inflation would outweigh any gains from facilitating trade and capital flows’ and that, 
while ‘conceived of as a way of reducing the risk of another intra-European war’, it was 
‘more likely to have the opposite effect’ and ‘lead to increased conflicts within Europe 
and between Europe and the United States’. 
The Anglo-Saxon hostility towards the EMU was coupled with the theory of 
Optimal Currency Area (McKinnon (1963), Mundell (1961)). A currency union of 
different economies has to fulfill several crucial requirements (e.g. high factors 
mobility, structural economic convergence, a fiscal equilibration mechanism). Most 
analyses of the EMU agree that these requirements are missing. Thus EMU is not an 
OCA. Dornbusch (2001) expressed summarily the opinion of the majority of US 
economists towards the euro: ‘It can’t happen, it’s a bad idea, and it can’t last’. This is 
also shown in Jonung & Drea’s (2009) wide-ranging (but also pro-EMU) survey of US 
economists’ opinions. But as soon as they were ready to discard the US views3 the 
eruption of the European sovereign debt crisis fomented US criticisms (accompanied 
with the aggravation of the US – EU rivalry4). 
                                                          
3 In a similar vein, De Grauwe (2003, p.58), while accepting the OCA theory and pointing out himself to 
certain EMU deficiencies, he rejects US skepticism: ‘The traditional theory of optimal currency areas 
tends to be rather pessimistic about the possibility for countries to join a monetary union at low cost’. 
4 For an analysis of the intra-imperialist contradictions between the US and the EU see Mavroudeas 
(2010a, 2010b, 2012). 
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OCA theory is the closer thing Mainstream economics have to the Marxist 
disproportionality (or uneven development) thesis. Essentially, OCA theory maintains 
that you cannot have a common currency for a set of very diverse economies. Thus - 
unless there either a similarity between the participating economies or at least some 
strong convergence process - a common currency would end up in failure. The OCA 
view relates the viability of the common currency to the productive structures of the 
member-economies. Of course, it does not profess any judgment regarding the 
possibility of convergence of the underlying ‘real’ economies. The Marxist uneven 
development thesis, on the other hand, argues that capitalism is characterized by the 
uneven development of either the regions within a single economy or between different 
countries. As such it is the exact opposite of the convergence thesis that is derived by 
definition from the neoclassical growth model5. Marxist Political Economy argues that 
convergence is a utopia and capitalism is inherently prone to uneven development. This 
unevenness refers primarily to the production sphere and is then expressed in the sphere 
of circulation. The unevenness of capitalist development can be managed within a 
national economy through economic policy and institutional means. However, it is 
extremely fragile and ultimately unfeasible in a supra-national union comprising of 
different economies with different economic necessities and polities. Mainstream 
economics cannot have this production-centered emphasis as they are by construction 
economics of the exchange sphere. The OCA theory is the closest possible notion to 
the disproportionality argument. It essentially states that unless there is a production-
based convergence then any circulation-based unification is futile. EMU’s structural 
problems vindicate this view. 
Concluding, this mainly Anglo-Saxon explanation of the Greek crisis while 
sharing the fiscal profligacy argument of the first explanation recognizes a rather weak 
structural cause. It concerns mainly the sphere of circulation (i.e. how the common 
currency is related to diverse national economies) and has not much to do with the 
sphere of production per se. Concomitantly, Greek and the Eurozone crises have to do 
mainly with the architecture of the European monetary system. 
 
II.3 The Greek problems has national origins exacerbated by errors in EMU’s 
structure 
The third Mainstream explanation of the Greek crisis is a ‘middle-of-the-road’ 
blend. It attributes the Greek crisis to the combination of national policy errors (high 
fiscal deficits and debt) with problems created by the incomplete architecture of the 
EMU. Moreover, it is argued that these problems can be solved with the deepening 
EU’s economic and political unification. This explanation is expressed mainly by 
European analysts that are in favour of European unification but have ideological 
                                                          
5 For a review of the convergence thesis see Mavroudeas & Siriopoulos (1998). 
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(basically Keynesian) and/or practical reservations regarding the actual process of the 
European integration. 
De Grauwe features prominently among this stream. In De Grauwe (2010a, p.1) 
he argues that the major responsibility for the Greek crisis ‘rests with the Greek 
authorities who mismanaged their economy and deceived everybody about the true 
nature of their budgetary problems’. But, he adds, that ‘the crisis has exposed a 
structural problem of the Eurozone”. This is the fact that the monetary union is not 
embedded in a political union and is lacking a fiscal union pillar. In another paper (De 
Grauwe 2010b) he explicitly rejects the fiscal profligacy argument for Spain and Ireland 
(but not for Greece). Similar arguments have been voiced by Lane (2012). Then this 
argument about EMU’s incompleteness is linked to the deteriorating current account 
imbalances that subvert its function. More specifically, the existence of a North-South 
dichotomy within the EMU – with euro-centre economies having current account 
surpluses and euro-periphery economies suffering from current account deficits – is 
recognized as a source of malignancies that threaten its existence. 
There are to main variants of EMU’s current account imbalances argument. The 
first is Mainstream and suffers nowadays from some form of intellectual schizophrenia. 
Blanchard & Giavazzi (2002) have argued that EMU economies have different savings 
rates (the poorer countries have lower savings rates) and different growth rates (less 
developed [and poorer] countries have higher growth rates). As a result of these 
differentials and within a supposedly convergence process (reinforced by the monetary 
union) there is a flow of funds from the richer countries to the poorer ones, thus 
resulting in a current account deficits for the latter. This was branded as ‘good 
imbalances’ that supported the convergence process and would ultimately be 
smoothened as this convergence process proceeded. Once the crisis erupted the 
proponents of this variants abruptly changed position and the ‘good imbalances’ 
became ‘bad’. This time it was the fiscal profligacy of the poorer countries that led to 
increased external borrowing and, thus, caused an unsustainable current account deficit 
(Jaumotte & Sodsriwiboom (2010)). This mainstream variant of the current account 
imbalances argument is compatible with the Twin Deficits Hypothesis. 
There is a second variant of the current account imbalances argument proposed 
by post-Keynesian criticisms of EMU (e.g. Botta (2012), Hein, Truger & van Treeck 
(2011), Stockhammer & Sotiropoulos (2012)). It is argued that EMU’s very structure 
causes real exchange rate differentials that favour the North at the expense of the South 
by making the former more competitive. Thus, euro-core economies acquire trade 
surpluses against euro-periphery’s trade deficits. This is reflected in the current account 
deficits of the latter. In this variant the Twin Deficits Hypothesis is rejected and instead 
current account deficits are posited as the cause of fiscal deficits (e.g. Nikiforos, 
Carvalho & Schoder (2014)). The more combative versions of this second variant argue 
that EMU is a neo-mercantilist structure where the North exploits the South. This 
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argument is even more pronounced in the more radical post-Keynesian 
‘financialization’ explanations of the crisis. 
The first variant of the current account imbalances argument has been taken up 
by the aforementioned Mainstream theorists that do not ascribe to the ‘financialization’ 
thesis but aim to rectify EMU by making it more unified (e.g. Merler & Pisani-Ferry 
(2012)). The usual additions are a fiscal union and a banking union. 
This third Mainstream perspective has also serious deficiencies. First, it offers 
only a ‘weak’ structural explanation as it discerns structural problems only in the sphere 
of circulation and neglects the sphere of production. It agrees with the second 
mainstream explanations with regard to EMU’s problems pointed out by the OCA 
theory. But it believes that a more unified economically and politically EU can 
overcome these problems. In this belief it departs from the harder versions of the second 
explanation which believe that an economic and political unification of the EU similar 
to that of the US is impossible. This is the second major problem of this perspective. 
Its political and economic voluntarism goes against historical wisdom. Europe has been 
the main ground where capitalism was born on the basis of the nation-state and national 
political and economic identities are deeply entrenched. This makes a politically and 
economically unified Europe a utopia. 
 
II.4 Mainstream explanations: A Critique 
The three Mainstream explanations analysed above represent broad lines of 
thinking. Overtime Mainstream explanations of the Greek crisis became more 
eclecticist and usually blend elements from all these basic lines of thinking (e.g. Nelson, 
Belkin & Mix (2011)). However, in the end, they fall into one of these three main sub-
groups.  
Moreover, the great majority of mainstream explanations, irrespective of their 
differences, ultimately understand the internal causes of the Greek crisis through the 
lenses of the Twin Deficits Hypothesis6. This is their hardcore analytical device since 
all of them identify the Greek crisis as simply a (fiscal) debt crisis which evolved in an 
external debt crisis (i.e. in toto as simply a debt crisis). Then wages are posited as the 
factor triggering both the fiscal and the current account deficits. It is argued that Greek 
(nominal) unit labor costs increased faster than those of the other European countries. 
Thus they worsened both the budget deficit and the current account deficit e.g. EC 
(2010), p.3). 
                                                          
6 Only the post-Keynesian variant of the third explanation might differ with regard to the Twin Deficits 
Hypothesis by stressing the current account imbalances as an independent factor causing the Greek 
problem. 
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There are a number of well-known problems with this argument. 
(1) There is an extensive literature disputing whether (nominal) unit labor costs 
are a convincing measure of competitiveness. 
(2) The Kaldor paradox argues that competitiveness is not an exclusive virtue 
of low wages; on the contrary. A crucial corollary of the Kaldor paradox is that 
competitiveness depends not only on costs and especially wage costs (costs 
competitiveness) but also on qualitative factors (structural competitiveness). 
(3) Contrary to the assertions of the EU and the Greek government, Greek wages 
have been constantly lagging behind productivity increases. Furthermore, Greek 
productivity increases have been much better that, for example, those of Germany. 
Thus, the Greek real unit labor costs (i.e. the wage share in the product) have been 
falling continuously for several decades. 
(4) A decrease in wages aiming to restore competitiveness presupposes that rival 
economies will maintain their wages stable or, at least, will reduce them less. However, 
the universal trend is a downward push on the level of the real wages. This can take 
place by two ways: a) directly through legal acts including the MOUs and, b) indirectly 
by the increase of the reserve army of employees due to depression, political turbulence 
and war conflicts. 
Some of these arguments have been voiced, rather shyly, even in the ECB 
bulletin before the onset of the crisis. Thus it has been convincingly argued that the data 
on labor compensation and productivity suggest that the weakness of the external 
accounts of several EMU countries comes from the international specialization of their 
economy, rather than from the ‘faulty management’ of the labor market. The ECB 
(2008, p.92) confirms this when it claims that in the first 10 years of the EMU the 
member economies with an overweight in labor-intensive sectors lost positions in favor 
of emerging economies with a relative comparative advantage, whereas member 
economies specialized in the higher-price and higher-quality segments of mature 
industries and products even gained market shares. This implies that the loss of 
competitiveness of some EMU economies was caused by structural deficiencies and 
not by wage increases. 
But the mainstream explanations of the Greek crisis have also wider problems. 
First, they totally underestimate the role of the 2007-8 capitalist crisis. This, as 
said before, is unanimously considered as a mere financial crisis without origins and 
causes in the sphere of real accumulation. However, if this crisis is so significant and 
lengthy as it appears to be, it must surely have some basis on the main sphere of 
economic activities (the sphere of production). 
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Second, they consider the Greek crisis as independent of the 2007-8 crisis. This 
is a point on which both international and Greek pundits agree. Most international 
reports (those of the EU, ECB and IMF included), before the onset of the Greek crisis, 
maintained that the Greek economy was insulated from the 2007-8 crisis and that, once 
the crisis erupted, it was left unattached. Indicatively, in a pre-election debate in 2009 
both G.Alogoskoufis and N.Christodulakis7 agreed that the Greek economy is insulated 
from the crisis because its banking sector is better capitalized than those of the West. 
The 2007-8 crisis has only an exogenous impact on the Greek economy by worsening 
the international economic environment and setting off grey expectations about 
sovereign debts. 
Last and compounding all the previous problems, all three mainstream 
perspectives fail to appreciate the fundamental structural dimensions of the 
problem at hand and instead relegate it either to policy errors and/or to weak structural 
origins. The first perspective, faithful to the typical neoclassical approach to economic 
crises, considers the Greek case a national specificity created by bad policies. The 
second perspective recognizes a rather weak structural cause. It concerns mainly the 
sphere of circulation (i.e. how the common currency is related to diverse national 
economies) and has not much to do with the sphere of production per se. 
Concomitantly, Greek and the Eurozone crises have to do mainly with the architecture 
of the European monetary system. The third perspective also attributes the structural 
problems to the sphere of circulation (with the additional argument that, contrary to the 
second perspective, these problems can be surpassed) and neglects the sphere of 
production. 
 
III. Radical ‘financialization’ explanations8 
Several Radical explanations9 of the Greek crisis have been advanced. The main 
points that differentiate them (apart from the methodology and the analytical tools) 
from the Mainstream explanations are the following: 
(a) They emphasize the crisis-prone nature of capitalism. Consequently, more 
emphasis is placed on the structure of world capitalism and on the 2007-8 
crisis. 
                                                          
7 They are both academic economists which have served as finance ministers the former of ND and the 
latter of PASOK. 
8 For a more extensive critique of the ‘Financialisation’ explanations see Mavroudeas (2014). 
9 The term ‘Radical’ is used here to denote approaches belonging to heterodox economics. That means 
perspectives belonging to the radical post-Keynesian, institutionalism, Radical Political Economy etc. 
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(b) They are critical of the neoliberal dominance of economic theory and policy 
over the last three or four decades and put the blame for the problems that 
arise to neoliberalism. 
(c) They criticize the neoliberal architecture of the EMU and argue either for 
its dissolution or for its radical overhauling. 
Overall, radical explanations are shy of recognizing the general deficiencies of 
the capitalist system; although several of them do mention them but in a rather implicit 
of disguised manner (e.g. Polychroniou (2013)). However, they do not think that the 
immediate problem is capitalism as such but rather its forms of management. Therefore, 
they strive for an end to neoliberalism and a return to more humane form of capitalism 
(or variety of capitalism, for those ascribing to the varieties of capitalism approach - 
VoC). The more politically radical versions consider this step a move towards a long 
but unspecified march to socialism. Several of these more politically radical approaches 
have a relation to Marxism and some even ascribe to Marxism as such. However, in 
this work we will treat them as separate from Marxism per se. This does not reflect a 
sectarian view but crucial analytical and political considerations. The gist of these 
considerations is twofold: 
First, the rate of profit – i.e. the crucial Marxist variable for understanding 
capitalism and especially its crises – is absent from their analyses. Instead some form 
of Keynesian lack of effective demand or neo-mercantilism argument is employed. 
Second, even the more radical versions that refer to socialist transition cannot – 
and in fact are unwilling to – define the exact process through which the overturn of the 
capitalist assault is a link in the transitional socialist program. 
The focus of this chapter would be on the ‘financialization’ versions of the 
Radical explanations. This does not imply that other versions do not exist. For example, 
there is another radical version that recognizes the Greek crisis as a mainly fiscal crisis 
but attributes it to the tax-evading and crony nature of Greek capitalists (e.g. Stathakis 
(2010)). Others (e.g. Laskos & Tsakalotos (2012)) add to this the argument about the 
trade imbalances existing within the EMU that we have seen in the third middle-of-the-
road variant of the mainstream explanations. The more traditional underconsumptionist 
explanations of crises (either of the Marxist Monthly Review (MR) or the Keynesian 
variant) are not popular regarding the Greek crisis. The main reason is that they do not 
fit to empirical data as the period preceding the onset of the crisis was characterized by 
a spectacular growth of consumption. Thus, underconsumptionist views usually hide 
behind the ‘financialization’ thesis. The latter is by far the more popular radical 
explanation of the Greek crisis. 
The ‘financialization’ thesis argues that in modern capitalism finance (i.e. the 
operation of money capital) assumes an increasing primacy in relation to other capitalist 
activities. With regard to Marxism the origins of this thesis go back to Hilferding’s 
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(1910 (1981)) seminal work and his implicit notion (never explicitly stated) that in 
modern capitalism finance takes a dominant position. It was somehow reiterated by 
Sweezy (1942). However, neither of them broke the classical Marxist relationship 
between surplus-value and interest. The former is extracted by ‘productive’ capital at 
the sphere of production and then it is redistributed between profits (accruing to 
‘productive’ capital), interest (accruing to ‘non-productive’ finance capital) and 
commercial profits (accruing to ‘non-productive’ commercial capital). 
A major change took place in the end of the 20th century. The predominance of 
neo-conservatism and the structural transformations of particularly the Western 
economies dictated by it led to widespread empirical beliefs (or stylized facts) that a 
new era of capitalism has come: finance has broken lose from the grips of ‘productive’ 
capital and has established it dominance on the former. Several neo-Marxist (but with 
a growing distancing from Marxism) and Institutionalist currents (e.g. the Regulation 
Approach) have already been signaling this conclusion. This led to the formation of the 
‘financialization’ thesis. Thus, in the beginning of the 21st century the term as such was 
coined by radical approaches belonging to the Keynesian and Marxist approach 
(particularly their ambiguous merge in the Monthly Review tradition). It was actually 
launched through a series of papers (by Kippner, Crotty etc.) in an influential collective 
volume edited by Epstein (2005). 
It was energetically adopted by post-Keynesianism who developed the concept 
and its analyses (e.g. Stockhammer (2004)) and sometimes treated the term as their 
exclusive property (e.g. Treeck (2008)). Seldom post-Keynesians posit 
‘financialization’ within stages of capitalism theory arguing that a new stage of 
capitalism has emerged by the end of the 20th century. This new stage is characterized 
as ‘finance-dominated capitalism’ (Hein (2013)) or ‘finance-dominated regime of 
accumulation’ (Stockhammer (2009)); the latter borrowing the terminology of the 
Regulation Approach. The post-Keynesian launch of the term ‘financialization was 
based on the Keynesian notion of the rentier; i.e. an ‘unproductive’ stratum collecting 
various rents which are being subtracted from profits available for productive 
investment. Thus, the rentier is a drag on capital accumulation. 
The incorporation of the term in Marxist analyses followed a bit letter. The 
Monthly Review (MR) school has used similar terms long ago (e.g. Sweezy (1994), 
Editors (2008)) but not actually coined the term. Thus it adopted it rather lately in order 
to explain the 2007-8 crisis since pure underconsumptionism had serious explanatory 
difficulties (e.g. Foster (2010)). Coming from a different perspective from that of the 
MR, Lapavitsas (2008) adopted the notion of ‘financialization’ and gave it a strange 
twist. He argued that ‘financialization’ is a new stage of capitalism. Till now his 
argument had nothing original comparing to its previous definitions. What gave it its 
18 
 
special flavor is the thesis that in this new stage of capitalism finance capital10 not only 
dominates ‘productive’ capital but it also exploits directly the working class through 
usurious activities (through the provision of loans). Thus the term financial exploitation 
was initially coined. After a series of criticisms (e.g. Fine (2009)11) for confusing 
capitalist exploitation with pre-capitalist usurious exploitation it was cosmetically 
changed to financial expropriation. However, the essential meaning of the term 
remained the same. 
Despite its popularity, the ‘financialization’ thesis is quite problematic on both 
analytical and empirical grounds. In analytical terms ‘financialization’ theories argue 
that capitalism has somehow returned to a pre-capitalist stage: the period when 
capitalist relations were not yet born but the pre-capitalist figures of the merchant and 
the banker – as they operated within feudalism – prepared the ground for capitalism’s 
birth. The crucial point of the operation of merchants and bankers in feudalism was 
unequal exchange and usury as a rule in contrast to equivalent exchange as a rule in 
capitalism. This functioning on the basis of unequal exchange was able because of the 
monopolistic and heavily regulated rules of the feudal system. Once however the 
primary accumulation of capital took place and capitalism established the monopolistic 
feudal rules were abolished and capitalist competition ruled. Then the operation of 
money capital took its characteristically capitalist modus operandi. The 
‘financialization’ thesis argues that this is liquidated and that there is a return to the pre-
capitalist modes of operation. In other words, ‘financialization’ theories maintain that 
interest ceases to be a part of surplus-value and that it acquires an independent 
existence. Concomitantly, money capital is not only autonomised from ‘productive’ 
capital but also dominates the latter. But, if the latter is the ultimate source of wealth, 
this domination would necessary entail - and this is actually a conclusion of 
‘financialization’ theories - a stifling of productive investment and thus of the 
accumulation of capital. The obvious question is how is it possible in the long-run such 
a deformed capitalism to exist. Additionally, regarding the 2007-8 crisis, 
‘financialization’ theories argue that it is not an a-la-Marx crisis (i.e. rooted in the 
sphere of production) but a financial crisis (a crisis of financialised capitalism). In this 
they agree with mainstream theories. An obvious question is that if the current crisis is 
so deep and prolonged as the ‘financialization’ theories accept then how it cannot be 
based on the fundamental economic sphere (the sphere of production). 
                                                          
10  The term ‘finance capital’ is not identical to Hilferding’s concept (which denotes the fusion of 
‘productive’ with banking capital under the dominance of the latter). It refers to capital operating in the 
financial system (i.e. money and capital markets). 
11 Fine (2009) uses also the notion of ‘financialization’ but in a different sense from that of the approaches 
mentioned before. For him it does not constitute a new stage of capitalism and of course finance capital 
cannot acquire an autonomous means of exploiting the working class (it will always be dependent upon 
the extraction of surplus-value by ‘productive’ capital). Thus, ‘financialization’ is a special phase of 
neoliberalism. New forms of operation of money capital and novel institutional arrangements are policies 
that are used by capital in order to surpass its problems and contradictions. 
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Three main financialisation explanations of the Greek crisis have been 
proposed: 
(1) The Lapavitsas’ version is based upon his theory of financial expropriation 
(2) The version advanced by Milios & Sotiropoulos and has affinities with the 
post-Keynesian notion of financialisation. 
(3) Argitis’ proposal of a Minskian explanation. 
 
III.1 Financial expropriation 
Lapavitsas et al. (2010a, 2010b) agree with the Mainstream explanations that 
the Greek is a debt crisis. But they add that it ‘is symptomatic of a wider malaise’ 
(2010a, p.11) that has its roots in (a) financialized capitalism and (b) the EMU. 
Financialisation caused the 2007-8 crisis (through leverage that created unsustainable 
bubbles) which is not an a-la-Marx crisis (that is, the profit rate played no role in it) but 
simply a financial crisis. The world crisis affected the fragile foundations of the EMU 
(because it is not an OCA). For Lapavitsas et al. EMU has three pillars: 
(a) the independent ECB which commands monetary policy 
(b) fiscal stringency 
(c) relentless pressure on wages in order to ensure competitiveness 
Lapavitsas accurately points out that ECB’s monetary policy follows the needs 
of the euro-core countries (the North). However, the third point agrees with the 
mainstream arguments on competitiveness. Then Lapavitsas et al. argue that the North 
(and especially Germany) was more competent in pressurizing wages and thus acquired 
a permanent competitive advantage against the South (the euro-periphery). This is again 
the mainstream argument in reverse: it is not the lazy Southerners but the over-prudent 
Northerners that caused the problem. 
Thus, the Eurozone was polarized in a North with trade surpluses and a South 
with debts: the North gave loans to the South in order for the latter to buy its products. 
The eruption of the 2007-8 crisis disrupted this structure as international financial 
markets questioned the creditworthiness of South’s sovereign debts. Thus, the 
Eurozone’s crisis began. According to Lapavitsas et al. the EMU transmitted the world 
crisis in Europe because of the imbalances that were latent within it. Again, till this 
point Lapavitsas et al. analysis does not differ essentially from post-Keynesian analyses 
which accept a North – South divide argument12. 
                                                          
12 For example Stockhammer (2011, p.90) argues that ‘this was not primarily a Greek crisis but a Euro 
system crisis’. ‘The Euro has long been a political project based on dubious economics’ (opp.94). EMU 
is part of the global neoliberal pattern which began with the deregulation of finance (the neoliberal mode 
of regulation) and gave rise to a finance-dominated accumulation regime. This polarized EU in two 
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The final conclusion of Lapavitsas’ analysis is that the EMU cannot be rectified; 
although he sometimes refers to a European Marshall scheme as a solution only to 
immediately discard it as implausible. Thus, he suggests the exit of Greece from the 
EMU but not from the EU. 
Lapavitsas’ explanation neglects any reference to the production structure of the 
Greek and the other EMU economies (for example differences in technological 
structure and productivity as expressed in their Organic Compositions of Capital 
(OCC)) or qualitative issues (productive specializations). Thus he is unable to see the 
existence of relations of economic (imperialist) exploitation between the North and the 
South (or else relations of ‘broad’ unequal exchange13) and he understands only a 
reversed and problematic version of the ‘narrow’ unequal exchange. Moreover, he 
accepts uncritically the Mainstream arguments about Greek relatively high wages being 
the cause of Greece’s deteriorating competitiveness (for example he accepts uncritically 
the high (nominal) unit labor costs argument). 
His analysis suffers also on the ‘financialization’ plain. The Greek financial 
system was significantly less leveraged than the Western ones. Additionally, Greek 
workers’ private debts are a relatively new phenomenon (they began with the 
introduction of the euro) and they are smaller than their Western counterparts. 
Therefore, ‘financialization’ cannot be discovered in Greece and has to be imported 
from outside. Thus, in Lapavitsas’ analysis ‘financialization’ is imported through public 
(and not private) external debt. 
Lapavitsas’ policy suggestions are also problematic. If the Greek crisis is simply 
a debt crisis then there may be solved not by exiting the EMU but by reforming it 
towards a full OCA (i.e. by unifying it fiscally and politically). If the crisis is something 
more profound and has to do with the sphere of production and relations of unequal 
exchange stemming from it then exiting the EMU and remaining within the Common 
Market want suffice. A full exit from the EU is required. But Lapavitsas shies away 
from this conclusion. 
 
III.2 ‘Financialisation’ and class struggle 
Contrary to Lapavitsas et al., Milios & Sotiropoulos (2010) argue that it was not 
the loss of competitiveness that gave rise to high indebtedness, but the other way 
                                                          
groups: a Northern one following export-led growth and a Southern one following credit-led growth 
(opp.86). 
13 Emmanouel (1972) distinguishes two categories of unequal exchange in international trade: 
(a) ‘Broad’ unequal exchange: it is derived from differences in the OCC, i.e. a more developed 
country (with higher OCC) exploits a less developed country (with lower OCC). 
(b) ‘Narrow’ unequal exchange: it is derived from differences in the wage rate and the rate of 
exploitation, i.e. a higher wages country is exploiting a lower wages country. 
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around. More specifically, EMU by bringing together countries with very different rates 
of growth and profitability, gives rise to high levels of borrowing for the euro-periphery 
countries. That is because euro-periphery countries have higher profit rates which 
attract capital from the euro-core. This trend was augmented since euro’s adoption 
because EMU allowed euro-periphery countries to borrow at low interest rates. Foreign 
loans boosted euro-periphery’s domestic demand, therefore giving rise to increasing 
inflation and the deterioration of competitiveness. Milios and Sotiropoulos essentially 
reject the North - South divide as an expression of the problematic Dependency theory. 
For them foreign loans were not a trick to rob Greece but a perfectly natural 
phenomenon that helped boost growth. On this point they totally agree with the 
mainstream arguments in Greece that the EU helped Greece’s development. Indeed, the 
pre-crisis mainstream argument was that current account deficits were good imbalances 
because euro-periphery countries with relatively low levels of real GDP per capita were 
catching up with richer north European economies. Greater growth opportunities and 
expectations of faster productivity growth justified elevated levels of fixed investment 
relative to the pool of domestic savings, hence the need for a current account deficit. 
Thus, Milios & Sotiropoulos implicitly accept the Mainstream convergence thesis and 
Blachard & Giavazzi’s (2002) version of ‘good imbalances’. But the reality of the 
Greek economy proved to be different. The sustained current account deficit did not 
finance investment in productive assets but was used to buy euro-core’s imported 
goods. Thus, Greece’s productive structure instead of being developed it was actually 
eroded. As a corollary, Greece instead of converging with the EU actually – after a 
period of convergence – started to diverge. 
Moreover, Milios & Sotiropoulos’ analysis replicates the fairy-tale ‘strong 
Greece’ story presented before the crisis by the mainstream academic and official 
circles. Then they add ‘financialization’. They argue that because modern capitalism is 
financialised it leads to extreme leveraging and financial bubbles. The 2007-8 crisis 
(which they too understand as a mere financial one) derailed the till then malevolent 
euro-periphery’s current account deficits. In order to sustain them fiscal deficits were 
augmented and this led to the euro-periphery’s collapse. 
For Milios & Sotiropoulos the EMU played only a peripheral role in this affair. 
Although they accept that EMU is not an OCA and that it is a neoliberal project, they 
do not envisage a Grexit (Greece’s exit from the EMU). but the progressive 
restructuring of the EU. 
 
III.3 Minskian inflation and disinflation 
Argitis (2012) proposes a Minskian financialisation explanation of the Greek 
crisis. He begins by arguing that Greek capitalism till today had: 
(a) a weak and obsolete technological structure. 
22 
 
(b) a structurally weak competitiveness (because of its weak and obsolete 
technological structure) causing chronic and significant current account deficits 
(because it was obliged to import a significant portion of either intermediate or final 
goods). 
(c) strong and extensive cronyism between private businesses and the state 
(resembling the Minskian notion of the ‘strong state’): the state (together with its central 
bank) managed the inflation – disinflation process (by using the fiscal deficits more as 
a redistributive tool than as an anti-cyclical one) in order to bolster capitalist 
profitability. 
For Argitis the basic cause of the Greek crisis is that Greece’s accession in the 
EMU dismantled this traditional structure without being able to substitute it with 
another equally functional. After entering in the EMU, the ‘strong state’ remained but 
lost its central bank (as the Bank of Greece followed the ECB directives). Consequently, 
debt management became dysfunctional and the financialisation of the economy 
became necessary. That is the economy’s growth was based on financial leverage. This 
increased the inherent instability of the capitalist economy (as Minsky’s (1992) 
Financial Instability Hypothesis suggests). Then the 2007-8 crisis (which for Minskians 
was caused by the neoliberal policy that dethroned the stabilizing Keynesian policy 
suggested by Minsky and, thus, increased financial instability) derailed the already 
unstable (because of EMU) Greek capitalism. The ‘strong state’ without a strong central 
bank could not manage and control the debt inflation – disinflation process. Hence, the 
Greek crisis erupted. 
The Minskian theory, has been rightfully criticized as (a) phenomenological and 
(b) focusing excessively on the financial system and neglecting the real economy. It has 
also been criticized for having a very narrow and poor understanding of the role of 
fiscal and monetary policy. This poor understanding derives from Minsky’s 
problematic conception about the role and the character of the monopoly in the 
capitalist system. 
Regarding the explanation of the Greek crisis, the Minskian perspective has 
serious problems. The more significant one is that the Greek crisis was not caused by 
excessive private debt. On the contrary, the latter is small comparing to that of the more 
developed Western economies. Thus, it cannot be convincingly argued that the Greek 
problem was borne from the inflation – disinflation circle of private debt. It is for this 
reason that Argitis (2012) leaves aside the typical mechanism of the Financial 
Instability Hypothesis and sticks more to Minsky’s (1986) previous work on the 
significance of the political and institutional framework for securing the stabilization 
of the financial system. His central argument is that the disintegration of the ‘strong 
state – strong central bank’ pair led to the inability of functionally managing the 
inflation – disinflation process. However, this argument is disputable because: 
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(a) It unwarrantedly assumes that the policy of the Bank of Greece was always 
accommodative during the post-dictatorship period 
(b) It equally unjustifiably implies that, after the accession to the EMU and the 
relinquishing to it of the monetary and exchange rate policy, the government and the 
Bank of Greece lost any ability to exert discreet policies. 
Finally, if Argitis (2012) explanation is correct, then the obvious policy 
suggestion is Grexit. But this is something that he rejects. 
 
III.4 ‘Financialisation’ explanations: a critique 
Apart from their analytical problems, the ‘financialisation’ explanations of the 
Greek crisis face serious empirical problems. For reasons of analytical clarity we can 
distinguish two versions of the ‘financialisation’ argument. The first version can be 
branded as strong ‘financialisation’: Greek capitalism is a financialised one. The second 
version can be branded as weak ‘financialisation’: Greek capitalism is not yet 
financialised but ‘financialisation’ is imported from the external environment (the 
world economy). 
The strong ‘financialisation’ argument requires there exist in the Greek 
economy and they are crucial in its functioning two basic conduits of ‘financialisation’: 
(a) The private sector should be financialised. That means that capital markets 
have dominated the financial system and have established their hegemony over its other 
pillar (the banking sector) which has been assimilated by them and follows their modus 
operandi. 
(b) For those ‘financialisation’ theories that argue that finance exploits directly 
(and independently from productive capital) the workers (e.g. Lapavitsas), there should 
be an exorbitant degree of indebtedness of private households. 
A series of studies have shown that the degree of financialisation of both the 
public and the private sector in Greece is strikingly low. This is explained by several 
reasons. For example, traditionally the Greek stock exchange had a small size and a 
minimal impact on the Greek economy. It was boosted aggressively by government 
policies in the late 1990s and had a meteoric growth for some years. Then it crashed in 
1999 never to recover again till today. Moreover, public and social entities (like the 
pension funds) had no or limited exposure to the stock exchange and to the ‘new 
financial products’. More importantly, Greek capitalism has always been and remains 
bank-centered as even mainstreamers recognize (e.g. Pagoulatos (2014)). This 
‘financialisation’ per se plays an insignificant role in private sector’s financing. 
The same empirical problems exist also in the second area. Private households’ 
indebtedness is strikingly low. Private households’ debt was traditionally low in 
Greece, began to increase after the accession to the EMU (with a very fast rate of 
increase indeed) and collapsed with the crisis. In absolute numbers it never reached the 
24 
 
levels of most western economies. Households’ low indebtedness has to do with the 
post-war structure of the Greek economy. The middle strata but also increasing 
segments of the peasants and the workers had the ability and the culture to save. This 
changed with the introduction of the euro when the savings ratio collapsed and 
households started amassing debts. The covert increase of inflation in mass 
consumption goods eroded the purchasing power of all these classes. Hence, in order 
to sustain their living standards and induced by the relatively low interest rates and the 
aggressive marketing policies of the banking sector households turned to debt. This 
explains the very high growth rate of households’ debt. However, this process was 
always significantly weaker than in Western economies and was terminated abruptly 
by the eruption of the Greek crisis. On top of all these, the Greek economy did not show 
any signs of weak – or even faltering – demand before the crisis; quite the contrary. 
The almost obvious empirical failure of the strong ‘financialisation’ argument 
leads many of its proponents to the soft version: ‘financialisation’ has been imported in 
Greece through the international environment. This argument is very weak. Apart from 
generalities about the ‘financial crisis of 2007-8’ there is no robust proof how 
‘financialisation’ was imported in the Greek economy. In toto, the ‘financialization’ 
explanations of the Greek crisis have a weak structural emphasis by not considering 
the problems in the sphere of production. For this reason they fail to account adequately 
for the Greek case. 
 
IV. Marxist explanations 
All the above explanations, despite of their different viewpoint and the political 
implications that arise from them, they share a crucial common analytical feature. 
Neither of these explanations attributes the crisis to the internal logic of the system. 
They either attribute it to policy errors or to weak structural factors pertaining mainly 
to the sphere of exchange. In contrast to them Marxist Political Economy offers a 
strong structural explanation of the Greek crisis by attributing its fundamental causes 
to problems grounded in the sphere of production. More specifically, it emphasises two 
structural components. First, it is argued that 2007-8 economic crisis is a crisis a-la-
Marx (i.e. stemming from the tendency of the profit rate to fall - TRPF) and not a 
primarily financial crisis and this represents the ‘internal’ cause of the Greek crisis. 
Second, it is shown that there is also an ‘external’ cause. This comes from the relations 
of imperialist exploitation (i.e. unequal exchange) that exist within the EU and which 
divide it between North (euro-core) and South (euro-periphery) economies. 
The main analytical differentiae specificae of the Marxist explanations is their 
use of the Labour Theory of Value (LTV) tools and the focus upon the profit rate. 
Another crucial issue, that affects significantly empirical analysis, is the use (or not) of 
the productive – unproductive labour distinction. To put it simply, empirical analysis 
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requires that National Accounts data are being transformed in order to correspond to 
the Marxian categories and the productive – unproductive labour distinction affects 
crucially these transformations. This framework is used to test whether the classical 
Marxist crisis theory (that is that a major crisis must be grounded in the sphere of 
production and expressed in a secular fall of the profit rate which then is transmitted in 
the rest of the circuit of capital) is applicable in the Greek case. The answer of the 
Marxist explanations is positive. 
Three main Marxist explanations have been proposed: 
(1) The first version emphasises the role of the TRPF in generating the crisis. 
This version adopts the productive – unproductive labour distinction in its empirical 
investigation. 
(2) The second version focuses upon the evolution of the profit rate and also 
discerns a falling profitability trend. But it recognises also other causes (apart from the 
TRPF) of this falling profitability. This version does not employ the productive – 
unproductive labour distinction in its empirical investigation. 
(3) The third version recognises also the TRPF as the systemic cause of the 
crisis but it emphasises also the problem of imperialist exploitation within the EU. This 
version also employs the productive – unproductive labour distinction in its empirical 
investigation. 
Regarding their policy suggestions, all Marxist explanations agree that what is 
required is a long-term transitional programme aiming to the creation of a socialist 
economy. They also agree that the crucial intermediate anchor of such a programme is 
Greece’s disengagement from the EU (and not simply from the EMU). Disengagement 
from the EU would liberate the ability to create a self-centered economy serving the 
people’s interests and being able to democratically plan the long-term structural 
transformations required in order to restructure the Greek productive system. 
 
 
IV.1 A TRPF crisis 
Maniatis & Passas (2013, 2014) estimate, using the methodology suggested by 
Shaikh & Tonak (1994), the main Marxian variables are estimated for the postwar 
period (1958-2009) period. On the basis of this analysis different phases of capital 
accumulation and growth are outlined and discussed. Then, the existence of a negative 
trend in the Marxian and the net profit rates starting before the 1973 crisis is verified. 
Moreover, it is shown that this falling profitability trend is caused by the increase of the 
organic composition of capital. 
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Maniatis & Passas, based on the analysis of the movement of the profit rate 
delineate three broad phases of capital accumulation in the Greek economy before the 
onset of the current crisis. The first one which lasts from 1958 until about the middle 
of the decade of the 1970s could be characterized as the ‘golden age’ of Greek 
capitalism: high profit rates (despite a slightly falling trend) caused high rates of capital 
accumulation and output growth, significant increases in productivity growth and 
increases in the real wage for productive workers and workers in general even with a 
rising rate of surplus-value. The second period is that of the stagflation crisis, starting 
in 1973-1974 and lasted until 1985. The significant increase in the OCC during the 
‘golden age’ combined with the fall in the rate of surplus-value and the profit share as 
a result of successful labour struggles after the fall of the military dictatorship, produced 
a sharp fall in profitability affecting negatively investment, output growth, productivity, 
real wage growth and employment. After 1986 (and especially after 1991) starts the 
third phase, that of neoliberalism. This led to a dramatic increase in labour exploitation. 
However, the resultant recovery in profitability was not coupled with a sufficient 
devalorisation of capital and a significant decrease of unproductive labour. These 
requirements were not politically feasible at that time. Hence, the neoliberal period 
brought about just a partial recovery of the profit rate, which resulted in a low rate of 
investment activity, output growth and most importantly slow productivity growth. 
Even the anemic output growth of the period, especially after 1995 (when the initial 
boost of neoliberal arrangements and institutions had lost steam and profitability during 
the neoliberal period had peaked) was achieved through the indirect impact of the 
financial bubbles created mostly by the expansive monetary policy of that period. Those 
bubbles, first in the stock exchange market and then in the real estate sector created 
significant ‘wealth effects’ for the households stimulating consumption demand, the 
only source of growth during the neoliberal period as low profitability held investment 
activity down. However, when all the bubbles burst the crisis erupted in 2009, this time 
with a time lag of just two years compared to what had happened in the major capitalist 
economies. Fundamentally, the crisis resurfaced due to the low profitability of capital, 
a result of capital overaccumulation caused by the rising OCCC. This rise could not be 
offset any more by increases in the rate of surplus-value or by some kind of expansive 
fiscal or monetary policy. 
 
 
IV.2 Causes of the Greek profitability crisis 
Economakis, Androulakis & Markaki (2014) study of the Greek economy for 
the period 1960-2012 focuses also on the key Marxian variables. 
They distinguish four basic phases. The first phase (1960-73) represents the 
‘golden era’ of Greek capitalism. During it the profit rate exhibited a striking increase 
(the best for the whole 1960-2012 period), peaking in 1973. The proxy variable for the 
27 
 
OCC was low for this period thus explaining the increasing profitability. Although 
wages increased during that phase, wage increases lagged behind labour productivity 
increases leading to the decrease of the labour share. The 1973 crisis was a benchmark 
as it ended the post-war ‘golden age’ of Greek capitalism. 
During the next phase (1974-85) profitability declined as labour struggles 
intensified in the aftermath of the fall of the military dictatorship. Also the OCC 
increased contributing to the falling profitability trend. The decline in profitability of 
this period ended in 1985, when the social-democratic government of Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement (PASOK) turned to neoliberal restrictive policies. 
The 1986-2006 phase of neoliberal policies was characterised by a weak 
recovery of profitability that stayed well below the levels achieved during the ‘golden 
age’ of Greek capitalism. There was also a non-significant decrease of the OCC because 
there was not sufficient destruction of capital during the crisis, so as to ensure the restart 
of capitalist accumulation on smaller and healthier bases. 
Finally, the last phase is that of the crisis (2007-12). During that phase there is 
a rapid fall in profitability leading to the lowest levels for the entire 1960-2012 period. 
This is accompanied by a dramatic increase of the OCC. 
From this study three main conclusions are drawn. First, that the Greek debt 
crisis is essentially a competitiveness crisis. Second, the hypothesis that the pressure of 
international competition was crucial for the profitability of the Greek economy is 
rejected, on the grounds that the latter was mainly on productive sectors not exposed to 
the international competition (non-tradable goods and services). Third, it finds that the 
deep depression that followed the troika austerity policies has led to a sharp decline of 
profitability, mainly due to the activation of the underconsumptionist factor of the 
crisis. This underconsumption, however, is only the form of appearance of Greek 
capitalism’s deeper problems, i.e. of its development model mainly in the 2000s. The 
economic growth with high current account deficits reached its limit when the onset of 
the global economic crisis blocked this type of development, since the transfer of 
‘savings’ from the European ‘centre’ to the European ‘periphery’ stopped. The ensuing 
implementation of the Memoranda’s austerity measures led to the emergence of the 
underconsumption trend. 
 
 
IV.3 A dual crisis of overaccumulation and imperialist exploitation 
Mavroudeas (2013) and Mavroudeas & Paitaridis (2014) have proposed a third 
Marxist explanation of the Greek crisis. By studying empirically the post-war 
development of the Greek economy it is found that the TRPF is the fundamental cause 
for both the 1973 and the 2007-8 crises. The empirical methodology used is similar 
with that of Maniatis & Passas (2014), stemming from Shaikh & Tonak (1994), with 
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two differences. The first difference is that the agricultural sector is considered a 
capitalist sector and is included in the estimations of the Marxian variables. The second 
difference is that the consumption of fixed capital of the unproductive trade and 
royalties sectors and the intermediate inputs of royalties sector so long as their value 
flows from the sphere of production is included in Marxian value added. The distinction 
between productive and unproductive labour is also employed in the construction of the 
Marxian variables. Another important feature of this Marxist explanation is the 
importance placed upon the ‘external’ dimension. It is argued that Greek is middle-
range capitalism with limited imperialist abilities. It continuously strives to exploit 
other areas and at the same time fall prey to the exploitation from its more developed 
western partners. 
On the basis of this investigation three main periods are being discerned after 
the 2nd WW: the ‘golden age’ (1960-73), the capitalist restructurings era (1973-85) and 
the neoliberal restructuring era (1985-2009).  
The ‘golden age’ was initiated after the 2nd W.W. and the civil war and thanks 
to its post-war restructuring and also the defeat of the Left. During that era Greek 
capitalism exhibited a remarkable profitability leading to a strong growth rate and also 
increased competitiveness; all of them leading to the ascendance within the 
international division of labour. However, the Greek post-war ‘golden era’ differed 
substantially from the western one in that it did not include a developed welfare state 
and was based on the suppression of workers’ rights and pay. Moreover, it had a 
significant imperialist component as Greek capitals expanded remarkably their 
activities particularly in the Mediterranean area and the Middle East. Similarly with the 
more developed western capitalisms the 1973 global crisis put an end to Greek 
capitalism’s ‘golden era’. As in the West (Shaikh & Tonak (1994)) the 1973 crisis in 
Greece was an overaccumulation crisis caused by a falling profit rate due to the increase 
of the organic composition of capital (OCC). The overaccumulation crisis was 
simmering in Greek capitalism since its ‘golden age’ as the increase of the rate of 
surplus-value started slowing down whereas OCC was rising rapidly. This caused a 
falling profitability trend that led in a curtailment of investment and a long period of 
anemic performance. Moreover, the 1973 crisis coincided with the fall of the military 
dictatorship and the reappearance of the labour movement. In order to defuse popular 
radicalism Greek capital was obliged to resort to progressive Keynesian policies of 
income redistribution in favour of the working class. Hence, Greek capitalism’s 
evolution was de-coupled from the West: it adopted progressive Keynesian policies of 
income redistribution later than the West and at a period when the latter turned to neo-
conservatism. This placed additional burdens on capital’s profitability and 
accumulation. 
Thus the post-dictatorship governments employed policies trying to combine 
(a) growth (which was slowing down due to global economic crisis) and (b) managed 
pro-labour income redistribution but in a manner not dramatically detrimental to 
capitalist profitability. 
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At the same time Greek capital made the strategic choice to participate in the 
European integration process and Greece became an EEC full member in 1981. The 
reasons behind this choice were: (a) to secure the system from popular radicalism, (b) 
to push through capitalist restructuring with the help of the then EEC and (c) to upgrade 
Greek capitalism from middle-range imperialism to a partner in one of the major global 
imperialist blocs. This contemporary ‘Big Idea’ of Greek capitalism was fraught with 
risks from its very beginning. Especially, it led to a declining competitiveness that 
caused a deteriorating current account deficit. 
However, these progressive Keynesian policies failed to address the economic 
crisis and to bolster the profit rate because they applied the successful post-war recipes 
in totally different socio-economic conditions. Post-war growth-boosting Keynesian 
policies were successful because the war had devalorised the previously 
overaccumulated capitals. This was not the case with the 1973 crisis as capitals 
remained critically overaccumulated in the aftermath of the crisis. Therefore, as soon 
as the post-dictatorship popular radicalism was checked, Greek capital abandoned 
progressive Keynesian policies and turned to capitalist restructuring policies 
inaugurating thus its second post-war era, which cover the whole 1985-2007 period.  
First, conservative Keynesian restructuring policies (anti-cyclical demand-led 
growth policies but without pro-labour income redistribution) were employed. At the 
same time Greece’s accession in the EEC removed trade protectionism and dealt a 
severe blow to Greek capital’s competitiveness against the more developed EEC 
economies. The conservative Keynesian policies had limited results as they failed to 
suppress adequately wages and devalorise overaccumulated capitals. 
They were succeeded by the already dominant in the West neo-liberal 
restructuring policies (formally introduced in 1990). As Greek capitalist restructuring 
was already lagging significantly, Greek neo-liberal policies almost bypassed 
monetarism (closed economy neo-liberalism) and espoused directly open economy 
neo-liberalism. EEC and EU directives played a crucial role in this. The neo-liberal 
agenda (opening of the economy, privatisations, curtailment of the welfare system, tax 
reforms benefiting the wealthy, deregulation of labour market and the financial system 
etc.) guided all the subsequent governments. Neo-liberal restructuring policies 
bolstered more forcefully than their conservative Keynesian predecessors labour 
exploitation which was expressed in the increase of the rate of surplus-value. Of 
particular significance was the marked increase of the actual work-time from the mid-
1990s and onwards (Mavroudeas (2013)), which reinvigorated the extraction of 
absolute surplus-value, after a considerable dormancy period. 
Concurrently, Eastern Bloc’s disintegration opened a new area of opportunities 
for Greek capital, particularly in the Balkans. Taking advantage of its geographical 
proximity and EU membership, it penetrated these countries reaping imperialist extra-
profits. Moreover, the massive migration to Greece from these – and later from other 
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as well - countries facilitated the depression of wages (especially in certain sectors, e.g. 
construction) and the expansion of flexible working relations. 
Greece’s 2001 accession in the EMU complicated the situation further. Greek 
capitalism attempted to decisively upgrade its position within the international division 
of labour by participating in the upper tier of European integration. But this strategic 
choice was risky since the severe constraints on national monetary, industrial and 
commercial policies weakened further Greek competitiveness vis-à-vis the euro-core 
countries which were characterized by productive superiority. In the beginning, these 
problems were ameliorated by securing – thanks to the euro - cheap credit that promoted 
an artificial growth. This was boosted further by the organization of 2004 Olympic 
Games in Athens whose exorbitant and over-priced works bolstered Greek (and 
western) capitals’ profitability but at the same time worsened fiscal deficit. Essentially, 
whenever capital accumulation faltered the Greek state stepped in and, directly or 
indirectly, subsidized it. The ballooning FD was manageable because of the cheap 
foreign loans and the relatively high growth rates of the Greek economy. 
On top of that Greek capitalism, during that period, followed the international 
trend of aggressively employing credit and fictitious capital expansion14. Cheap credit 
was boosted by euro’s low interest rates. The stock market became for a short period a 
major (but never the dominant) source of enterprise finance, whereas traditionally its 
role and size were minimal. By artificially (through government policy and bank cartel 
agreements) lowering interest on deposits to negative real rates, the vast majority of 
traditional middle-class depositors was pushed to the stock market with the promise of 
higher returns. It is exactly in this period that the traditional post-war popular and 
middle-class propensity to save collapses15. This inflated the stock market for a short 
period till its collapse in 1999-2000. In public discussions this was branded as the ‘stock 
market robbery’ as the great majority of small ‘investors’ lost their holdings. 
                                                          
14  This does not verify the financialisation hypothesis, as already argued, for the 
following reasons. Firstly, it was a very short-term phenomenon and did not succeeded 
in changing the traditional features of Greek capitalism, Thus, secondly, the financial 
system remained a bank-based one. Thirdly, households’ debt increased rapidly but 
never achieved western levels. Furthermore, it collapsed equally rapidly. In toto, there 
was no significant long-term structural change of the Greek economy along the 
financialisation lines. The only effect was an artificially boost of capitalist 
accumulation through fictitious capital and lax monetary policy. 
15 Wage earners’ savings collapsed mainly because euro’s introduction ushered rapid 
price increases in mass consumption goods and thus eroded their saving ability. Middle-
classes’ savings collapsed because they faced negative real interest rates in bank 
deposits and were lured to the stock-market. 
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Additionally, private consumption was artificially ballooned via cheap personal 
credit offered by the banks. As a result, household debt increased significantly. This 
fomented consumption for a considerable period and boosted economic growth. 
Lastly, during that period there was an influx of foreign capitals that either 
speculated in the stock market or were invested in services. A very small portion of this 
influx went to productive investment as indicated by the rather low share of FDI to 
GDP (see http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/foreign-direct-investment-net-
inflows-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html). 
. 
All these unsustainable and conjectural factors led to an ‘artificial boom’ period 
with better than the rest of the EU growth rates. This ‘artificial boom’ period had 
another hidden handicap: there was a steep increase of unproductive activities 
(particularly around finance and trade) which eroded internally profitability’s 
foundations. 
To sum up, the period 1985-2007 was marked by capitalist restructuring waves 
which strived to reverse the falling profit rate trend and the overaccumulation of capital. 
Their policies revitalized the counteracting forces to the TRPF by (a) increasing the rate 
of surplus-value, (b) reducing the value of labour-power, (c) reducing the value of 
constant capital, (d) reducing turnover time, (e) increasing foreign trade and (f) reaping 
imperialist extra-profits from abroad. These restructurings were only partially 
successful. There was a recovery of the profit rate but this never reached the level 
achieved in the beginning of its fall. Moreover, capital was insufficiently devalorised 
as Greek capitalism shied away from the deep and painful devalorisation required. Thus 
the fundamental problems remained and the ‘financialisation’ tricks and the ‘artificial 
growth’ only postponed and at the same time augmented them. 
The 2007-8 crisis ended abruptly this euphoria. The ‘artificial boom’ collapsed 
and the lurking behind profitability crisis resurfaced. The ‘financialization’ deus-ex-
machina postponed the crisis but, at the same time, amplified further the problem of 
overaccumulation. As soon as productive capital’s profitability - under the auspices of 
which surplus-value (and thus total profit) is generated – started tattering crisis re-
emerged in all its glory. ‘Financialization’ gave only a temporary respite to the crisis of 
profitability but at a very high cost. It increased significantly the portion of surplus-
value extracted by productive capital but accruing to money capital. This aggravated 
further the falling profitability of productive capital and set the whole house on fire. 
Additionally, imperialist extra-profits collapsed as the Balkan economies entered 
recession and competition with other stronger imperialisms was aggravated. Also, the 
global financial collapse ended cheap credit. Thus, Greek capitalism abruptly fell in 
crisis. 
This crisis is characterized as a dual crisis of overaccumulation (caused by the 
TRPF) and imperialist exploitation (that traumatized Greek capital’s profitability and 
productive structure). This dual crisis took the form of the twin deficits (fiscal and 
current account deficit). The fiscal deficit was augmented because the state rushed to 
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subsidise the private sector. The current account deficit was already worsening because 
of the falling competitiveness of Greek capital vis-à-vis its western competitors. Then 
the one reciprocally worsened the other. That is, contrary to the Mainstream twin 
deficits hypothesis, bot deficits are expressions of the falling profitability of Greek 
capitalism. 
 
V. In place of conclusions 
This paper argues that in order to explain such a deep and protracted crisis as 
the Greek one, an explanation founded on the fundamental economic structure of 
Greece and EU should be sought for. This significance of the structural dimension is 
implicitly accepted nowadays by even those explanations that do not place emphasis on 
it. 
For example, whereas Mainstream explanations focus on debt they have moved 
– even before the 2nd Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - towards 
recognizing a ‘structural’ dimension. In subsequent reviews of the programme there is 
a marked slide towards structural reforms. This was coupled with a rather shy and 
limited but explicit debate about a ‘new economic and productive model’. However, 
neither the EU nor the Greek politico-economic elite have spelt out a detailed and 
concise plan of what is this ‘new economic and productive model’. This is partly caused 
by Mainstream theory’s inability to grasp effectively structural issues and particularly 
the sphere of production. 
Radical explanations of the Greek crisis cannot also grasp properly this 
structural dimension. Their infatuation with the inappropriate for the Greek case 
financialisation perspective has led them to ignore the deep structural problems of 
Greece’s productive model. Thus, they emphasise weak structural aspects (mainly 
around the monetary sphere and trade) and neglect to study the sphere of production. 
For this reason their policy proposals are limited in methods of making debt viable and 
reforming of leaving the EMU. The issue of the productive restructuring of the Greek 
economy is either absent or merely paid a lip service. 
On the contrary, Marxist approaches exhibit a better ability to account for the 
Greek crisis. Their main thrust is that they seek a deep structural explanation and focus 
especially on the sphere of production. Concomitantly, their policy proposals 
emphasise the need for a progressive productive restructuring of the Greek economy. 
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